

Five key insights on emerging markets equities
Emerging markets have always been considered the wild west (or east) of equity investing. In this piece, two veteran Robeco portfolio managers share five lessons they have learned investing in EM in the past three decades.
概要
- Watch your forex exposure and employ active management
- Volatility is now equivalent to developed markets
- Governance reform is reinforcing investor confidence in emerging markets
In 1994 Robeco launched its Emerging Markets Equities strategy to apply its expertise in the era of globalization. We believe that success depends on a consistent style and a stable team: portfolio manager Wim-Hein Pals has been managing the strategy since the beginning. Wim-Hein is joined by another Robeco veteran, multi-asset portfolio manager Arnout van Rijn, to share five of lessons learned in the past 30 tumultuous years.
Robeco entered emerging markets (EM) to invest in fast-growing global economies, but we quickly had to learn hard lessons about how to potentially beat a passive approach by being tactical and clearsighted. When the strategy was launched in 1994, we were in the so-called ‘tequila crisis’, when Mexico was still a big part of the EM index, and the peso crashed but worse was to follow later in the 1990s.
Before you invest in an emerging market, you have to be comfortable with currency risk, of which Thailand in 1997 was a great example. The Thai baht fell from 25 to 29 against the USD we decided to close the hedge, but the THB continued to fall until it bottomed finally in 1998, around 50.
Being aware of the risk of such a fall is important in positioning. The Thailand crisis taught us to avoid a common mistake in EM investing: entering or re-entering a market too soon after a crisis to try and get in ahead of a recovery. It’s probably better waiting a bit too long and losing a bit of the upside than being too early and going down another 20%. That was definitely a lesson learned. Today this informs our approach to countries like Turkey and Argentina. It’s important to be patient and wait for a period of stability in order to go neutral before going overweight, as these crises have tended to overhang asset prices for longer than you might think.
Active management is essential
Beating the benchmark consistently was (and is) very much about active management with a disciplined investment process. The positive 30-year track record of the Robeco Emerging Markets Equities strategy against its benchmark rests to a large degree on companies we have owned throughout this period. Samsung Electronics and TSMC are two companies that have completely transformed over this period of time. We visited Samsung in the 1990s and it was a completely different company back then, but even then the company impressed with its technology focus. TSMC had visionary leadership and the consistent execution that builds trust, even through cyclically weak periods or when competition emerged.
We also followed structural themes like being long consumer discretionary combined with underweight consumer staples – that has been a consistent bias, but the exceptional companies still stand out. TSMC and Samsung are also emblematic of a key development – that the tech sector was basically non-existent in EM when we started. Materials, utilities and banking used to dominate, but now the tech sector is around 25% of the MSCI EM Index.
For active managers in EM, the global financial crisis was also a key turning point for region and country allocation and keeping a clear head. Just as in developed markets (DM), EM sold off at the end of 2008, with unprecedented collapses in some of the cyclical companies. Sticking to our investment process and strategy was crucial here. EM didn’t turn around until March 2009, when EM in general enjoyed one of its best years ever.

Emerging markets’ second growth wave is straight ahead
The best time to invest in emerging markets was 30 years ago. The next best time is today
Volatility has turned to (relative) stability
EM have always been characterized as more volatile than developed peers – but that has started to change recently. It wouldn’t be a surprise to us if the volatility of EM in the longer term declines below the DM level. This is because of improved economic fundamentals in EM and the fact that recent financial crises have originated in DM and not in the emerging world. The recurring crises in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, and the crisis of 1997 in Thailand and South East Asia, left EM banks much more cautious. That was not always ideal for minority shareholders, but it did leave lots of EM financial institutions better capitalized than DM peers. That caution also spilled into macroeconomic policy leaving EM economies with solid fundamentals and more policy flexibility.
Local interest has also had a very important influence on both volatility and returns. India, Thailand and Taiwan are great examples where domestic investors are key to the market dynamics. The increasing wealth in EM across the income distribution and rising level of financial inclusion is intensifying this effect. The fact that EM are being driven by domestic investors and institutions in the long run is a good sign, because it shows there is a connection between economic growth and stock market performance. The institutionalization of emerging equity markets has been a strong driver in India in recent years – a structural change where an increasingly wealthy population is sending inflows into the domestic stock market month on month. However, the reverse has been happening in China. Domestic confidence in equities has been a detractor there in the past year, so that needs to be restored before any recovery can be sustained.
Governance reform is gradually improving returns
We recently investigated the Korea discount – how Korean stocks have been trading at consistently lower valuations than comparable companies in similar markets. Well, it’s been down to governance and corporate strategy and this is a long-term issue. To highlight Samsung again in the early 1990s, we saw the merit of increasing our weight, but at the same time, we all knew that they were not focused on return on equity (ROE), nor on the minority shareholders. Back in those days, they were really targeting the number one position in market share, not making a nice return over their cost of capital. So that became a long-term theme and as the company matured we gradually started to enjoy the fruits of that change toward a focus on ROE.
Understanding a company’s management focus in EM and how much value there is to unlock is really important and is standing us in good stead wherever in the emerging world we invest. The research from the Robeco Sustainable Investing team has been instrumental in that regard and has helped us identify governance risks earlier in the investment process. This is where Asia has been playing catch-up. The number of IPOs coming from Asia has been phenomenal in the past two decades. In Latin America, the corporate culture was already basically Americanized and corporate behavior was more like US companies, potentially because many companies already had ADR listings.
Stay true to value style and leverage quant tools to enhance returns
We started in 1994 from a point where we were doing traditional fundamental analysis the Robeco way. We did lots of research on key factors back in the early 1990s, and we found out that in EM, value was a much better style, performance-wise, than growth. Over the whole three decades, this definitely helped us in terms of outperforming the benchmark. There’s also a general herd mentality in markets and that’s related to our comments about financial inclusion and institutionalization. In some markets retail investors would drive stocks to crazy levels, and we would take that as a signal to reduce our exposure. In addition, from very early on in our EM journey we leveraged Robeco’s quantitative rankings, which were value-focused as well, and that quant expertise has always given us discipline.
In the philosophical debate on being a growth or a value investor, we are clearly on the value side. That said, the debate didn’t exist until the 2000s, so it was more like we were not willing to overpay and we were always trying to go against short-term hypes and maintain a long-term focus. Momentum still plays a role in our EM process, and we understand you can run a long way past fundamentals, and that has to be respected. Going back to that Thailand experience in 1997 and 1998, we have also used charts to assess momentum. We believe that the more retail orientation you have in the market, the more momentum works. That puts us in a basket of ‘value with momentum’. We’re definitely not deep value managers. In the future, as we see EM getting more institutionalized, we will get fewer of those opportunities where retail investors do crazy things, both on the downside as well as on the upside. Whether that comes to pass or not, we are confidently looking forward to the next thirty years in emerging markets!
獲取最新市場觀點
訂閱我們的電子報,時刻把握投資資訊和專家分析。
重要資料
本網站僅供《證券及期貨條例》(香港法例第571章)及其附屬法例所界定之專業投資者瀏覽及使用。 投資涉及風險。過往表現並不代表未來表現。本網站所載資料僅供參考之用,並不構成任何投資建議,亦非作出買賣任何證券或採納任何投資策略之要約或招攬。投資者不應僅憑本網站提供之資料作出投資決定,在作出任何投資決定前,應徵詢獨立意見(包括有關稅務影響之意見)。投資者應確保完全理解投資產品的相關風險,亦應考量自身投資目標及風險承受水平。投資乃閣下之個人決定。除非銷售投資產品的中介人已向閣下告知該投資產品適合閣下,並已解釋其符合閣下投資目標之原因,否則閣下不應投資。請參閱相關發售文件或其他法律文件,以獲取包括風險因素在內的進一步詳情。 本網站由荷寶投資管理香港有限公司發布,該公司受香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會(「證監會」)規管(中央編號:APU851)。本網站未經證監會審閱。 無法保證任何投資產品可實現其投資目標。概不就任何投資產品之表現或投資回報作任何聲明或承諾。投資的價值或會波動。本網站所載過往表現、推算或預測,均不應視作未來表現之保證或指標,且概不提供任何明示或暗示之保證。本網站內容建基於相信為可靠之來源,惟因應資料傳遞技術特性及須採用多項數據來源(包括第三方內容),故概不保證其準確性。所述觀點僅乃截至上述日期,或會隨市況變化而改變,可予更改而毋須另行通知。該等意見可能有別於其他荷寶投資專業人士之意見。因使用本材料或當中所載任何評論、意見或估算而引致之直接、間接或相應損失,荷寶概不承擔法律責任。荷寶並無責任更新本網站或任何網站內容。未經荷寶事先書面許可,不得複製、分發或刊發本網站任何材料。 除非另有說明,資料來源:荷寶。
































